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WASTHEGREAT DEPRESSION A LOW-LEVEL EQUILIBRIUM?
ABSACT
Was the Great Depression the outcome of a massive
coordination failure? Or was it a unique equilibrium response to
adverse shocks? More generally, do aggregates fluctuate partly
because agents occasionally settle on inferior, low-level
equilibria? These questions lie at the heart of the current
disagreement over how one should view business cycles. This
paper estimates an employment model with monetary and real
shocks. In one region of the parameter-space the model yields
uniqueness, while in the other it yields up to three equilibria.
When more than one equilibrium exists, a selection rule is
needed. The equilibrium selection rule that we use has a
Markovian structure, but the money supply is denied a
coordination role --itcan not affect the choice of the
equilibrium point. The global maximum likelihood estimates lie
in the uniqueness region, implying that instead of being a
low-level, coordination-failure equilibrium, the Depression era
was caused by movements in fundamentals only. This result held
for each of the three subperiods (since 1900) for which the
estimation was done, but the estimates are imprecise and the
conclusions that we draw from them are tentative. The paper also
computes the local maxima in the region of multiplicity, and here
some of our estimates indicate that the years 1932 and 1933 would
have exhibited low level equilibria had more than one equilibrium
existed.
John Dagsvik Boyan Jovanovic
Statistisk Sentralburo Department of Economics
Box 8131 dep New York University
N-Oslo 1 269 Mercer Street,
Norway 7th Floor
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NBERWas the Great Depression the outcome of a massive coordination failure?
Ot was it a unique equilibrium response to adverse shocks? More generally, do
aggtegates fluctuate pattly because agents occasionally settle on inferior, low-
level equilibria? These questions lie at the heart of the current disagreement
over how one should view business cycles. This paper proposes a methodology
within which such quesrions can be addressed.
In the real business cycle model (Prescott 1986) aggregates fluctuate
because unique equilibrium points are displaced by shocks to technology. These
shocks are intrinsic because they affect production possibilities. When money
also affects trading possibilities (Lucas 1972) then a change in the supply of
money too is an intrinsic shock that causes aggregate fluctuations.'
The real and the monetary approaches to fluctuations have both met with
skepticism. Many reject the real business-cycle assumption that reductions in
output are caused by technological regress (Greenwald and Stiglitz ,1988).And,
money does not seem to lead the cycle (Kydland and Prescott, 1990), or explain
much of the output variation (Sims 1980).2 The emerging literature on
coordination failures, summarized recently by Howitt (1990), takes a different
view.It seeks to explain at least some aggregate fluctuations by means of
exttinsic shocks, shocks that act to select one of several equilibrium outcomes.
While the equilibrium point need not be chosen by an extrinsic random device --
thechoice could reflect the realization of some observed or unobserved intrinsic
shock -- modelswith multiple equilibria can clearly generate more volatility
because aside from any intrinsic shocks that they may contain, they can also
In Lucas's model equilibrium is unique within the class of equilibtia that
he considers, although there may be others that he does not consider that are
more complicated functions of the histoty.
2 And the variation in output that money does cause often in the wtong
direction (Todd, 1990).include a random mechanism that causes jumps among equilibria.
Some analyses of aggregates allow for random jumps among regimes (e.g
Hamilton 1989) but few build an equilibrium model of the economy that generates
regimes endogenously as branches of its equilibrium correspondence.3 This is
what we shall do here. We shall ask whether aggregate labor market fluctuations
reflect, in part, jumps among three Pareto-ranked equilibria.The jumps are
driven by an extrinsic Markov process.The model has two real shocks and a
monetary shock.Par some parameter values equilibrium is unique, while for
others there are three equilibria. Surprisingly, the maximum likelihood
estimates lie in the uniqueness region. This is surprising because the multiple
equilibrium subset of the pmrameter space has more parameters: besides the
structural parameters, there also are the parameters of the equilibrium choice
mechanism. The selection parameters are estimated jointly with the structural
parameters, in the spirit of Kiefer and Wolfowitz (1956), and they were estimated
separately for three different periods. In each case they were located in the
uniqueness region.Even the 1920-1940 period, chosen especially because it
contained the Great Depression --aperiod that many think was a separate regime,
a breed apart from the rest --yieldedthe same result.4
Out aim here is to answer a specific question. In proceeding, we shall
ignore some potentially useful information (such as data on wages) that, for
technical reasons, we could not deal with. We shall ignore the possibility that
the money supply was endogenous. All this limits the value of this paper as an
Exceptions are Butler and Michell (1989), and Manning (1989), although
they proceed quite differently from us.
ATheGreat Depression was anomalous not only in its severity but also in
its character. Pot instance, Table 12 of Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988) shows
that in Germany, Australia, the Hetherlands, the U.K. and the U.S., real wages
were higher at the trough of the depression in 1932 than had been at its outset
in 1929.investigation into the causes of the Great Depression. The paper's contribution
is therefore largely methodological: Questions such ss the one we ask are likely
to come up sgain and again, and the way that one goes about answering them will
probably have to resemble what we do here.1. Detecting Multiplicity.
What dynamic behavior, in general, would one look for to see if the date
are driven by jumps among distinct equilibria? This question can he answered
only with e specific model, end even there we now have examples in which one can
net identify the presence of extrinsic uncertainty (Hamilton end Whiteman, 1985)
One must therefore restrict the way that intrinsic and extrinsic data affect
observables so as to get identification in the sense of eq. (2) of Jovanovic
(1989) --withoutrbis, even an infinite sample will not contain the answer we
seek.
Deterministic models with multiple solutions suggest that data should
cluster around distinct equilibrium points.5 Methods for finding the number of
distinct clusters have been extensively discussed in the statistical literature
(Fukunaga 1972). Here we shall add structure to the problem, structure of the
kind commonly found in economic models. Let y be an endogenous observable, x an
exogenous observable, and c an exogenous jobservable. The pair (x, c) is then
an aggregate shock. Modifying Cooper's (1987) exposition slightly, let U(y, y'
x, c) be the representative agent's payoff funttion in the state (x, c) when he
takes a decision y, and when all others take the decision y'.Let U be
continuously differentiable and concave in y, and let f(y', x, c) be the optimal
action for the agent at hand. Assuming that the maximum is interior, we must
have
(1) f(y,y',x, €) =0 at y =f(y',x,e)
8y
Unless, of course, there is a continuum of equilibria.The set of symmetric Nash equilibria for the game indexed by (x, c) is
(2) (x,c) ={y Iy=f(y,x,c)
To say something about the observable implications of the restriction in equation
(2) we shall now get more specific and assume thate
7 3 f(y,x,c) =x +c+(_—)y+(_)y—y




6 It is hard to derive any observable implications in a general model with
multiple equilibria. This was shown by Jovanovic (1989). One must make stron
assumptions about the selection rule in particular, as Goldfeld and Quandt (1972
and Quandt (1972) pointed out some time ago. Also, see Kiefer (1978), Lee and
Porter (1984), Coslett and Lee (1985) and Hamilton (1989). Lemma 1 of Jovanovic
(1987) shows that for any f, a payoff function can be found that generates it as
the optimal reaction function. The payoff function
U(y, y' ,x,c) —yf(y',x, c) -y2/2is one (among many) that does the job.
Obviously, any monotone transform of U would work too.
5
Figure 1: The determination of equilibriumFor some (x, c) pairs there will be three equilibria such as A, B, C, and for
others there will be just one, such as D. The term x+c shifts f up by the same
amount for all y.7 With these assumptions about f,
9 3 (3) (x, )yER x *E-()y*(_)yy 0
The equilibrium correspondence is therefore the set of solutions to a cubic
equation in y. it is drawn in Figure 2.
' qJ(x,g)
0625
Figure 2: The symmetric equilibrium correspondence.
For x+ a (0, .0625) there are three equilibria. At x+ —0and x+e —.0625
Many models have exactly three equilibria such as A, B, and C. This
example will motivate the Phillips curve model that we shall estimate, and it
will bring out some observable implications of multiplicity that should apply
more generally.
6there are exactly two, and everywhere else, equilibrium is unique. Now let's
assume an equilibrium selection device that assigns equal probability to each
branch of the equilibrium correspondence, conditional, of course, on x+c. So,
for instance, when x+C E(0,0625), each equilibrium branch gets a probability
of 1/3.Let us also take c to be distributed normally with mean zero and
variance a.
One way to summarize this model's implications is to look at the
expectation of y conditional on x, E(yx) and its conditional variance V(yx)
In doing so, we shall ask how fast information is lost as a grows. The upcoming
figures are based on a simulation that, for each value of x, drev 500 c's and
computed g(yx) and V(yx) .ThoseC's for which x+c C[0,.06251 also
necessitated an equiprobable assignment to the 3 branches.
For a —.001the real side of the model is essentially deterministic, and
all randomness stems from the selection device. That is why in Figure 3,V(yx)
is positive only for x a [0, .0625], and why E(yx) jumps as x crosses the
boundary of the region of multiplicity.
Figure 4 shows that these features of the data should remain visible as
-
longas a is an order of magnitude less than the range of the region of
multiplicity. However, Figure 5 shows that as a gets to be of roughly the same
order as the magnitude of the region of multiplicity, the discontinuous-like
behavior of both E(yx) and V(yjx) disappears, although one can still see
tremendous heteroskedasticity in y as x varies. Finally, as we increase a even
more, E(yx) becomes quite smooth, but the heteroskedasticity remains. This is












































































































































































 multiplicity than E(yx) if we expect a fair amount of noise. Indeed, this is
what one would expect generally: If multiple equilibria arise in some region of
x-space then switching among equilibria will create additional variance in y when
x enters the region in question.
Why does this class of models exhibit multiplicity for intermediate values
of x+c, and not at the extremely high and low values of x+f? The reason is that
for tail values of x+c, playing high or playing low is a dominant strategy for
a fraction of the population that is large enough to rule out multiplicity.2. A Macroeconomic Model of Employment.
We shall estimate a model of employment with monetary shocks as well as
real demand and supply shocks that has three equilibria for some parameter
values. The only exogenous observable will be the money supply, or rather its
surprise.
Agents differ in their fixed costs of employment c. Agent c takes
action mc(0,1). If mc —1he works, while if s —0he stays home, The
expected payoff to working is #(,x,u), where x is the monetary surprise, u
a shock to aggregate demand or productivity, and a the fraction of agents that
work. The net payoff to agent c is
f(xu) -c if a =1,end
0 ifac=0.
Being of measure zero, each agent takes a as given. And if his c is less
than (a,x,u), he will play a —1.Let v be an aggregate shock to the supply
of labor and let F( v) be the distribution of c. Then m Nash equilibrium is
en employment rate y for which
(3) y —F[(y,x,u);v].
The model is static.8 Its dynamics stem entirely from shocks to the supply of
6 And it is much like Diamond's (1982) coconut example. Let coconuts grow
on trees that cost c utils to climb, let F be the distribution of costs over
trees, end let esch person see one tree per period. Eating s coconut yields one
util, while hunger yields zero utils. Eating one's own coconut is taboo, snd the
probability of meeting a trading partner is .Thenumber of people climbing
trees is "employment", and equilibrium employment solves (6).
10money, and from shocks to the demand and the supply of labor.9
We now get specific about F and .LetF(c;v) —11(1+vc8)for c 0,
where fi> 0.An increase in v shifts the disttibution of costs to the right,
and therefore dampens the supply of labor.
We shall parametrizein such a way that two regimes will arise. In one
regime, "regime U", equilibrium will be unique for all values of the exogenous
data. In the other, "regime M", there will be three equilibria, for at least
some values of the exogenous data.Equilibrium employment, y, is at rhe
intersections with the 45" line in Figure 7, and for some parameter values there
will be three such intersections.10
Ifwere defined to be the real wage, this model would find it hard to
ascribe low-level equilibrium status to the Great Depression, because the early
years of the depression saw a rise in the real wage. Since equilibria are on the
45° line in Figure 7, and since F is increasing, this implies that employment and
An infinite number of (,F)pairs can produce the same composition FØ).
Roger Klein has pointed out to us that this identification problem also shows up
in discrete choice models; see Manski (1987). The problem can be solved if one
has information on or F separately. For instance if one assumed thatis the
marginal product of labor and hence under price-taking also equal to the wage,
then one could use wage-data to identify and F separately.But could
incorporate queuing considerations, or synergies between market and non-market
returns, or even lifetime returns that current wages do not capture. This, as
well as the added complexity that a second endogenous variable would bring to the
empirical work, led us to confine our analysis to just one endogenous variable
(employment). On the other hand, Cogan (1981) estimates the mean of F at around
1,000 1966 dollars, although his estimate is for direct costs only, and excludes
utility gained from nonmarket activities.
For regime M to arise one must have a region in which increases rapidly
enough with y. This could be because of trading externalities (Diamond 1982,
Hall 1989), pecuniary externalities (Shleifer 1986, Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny
1989), or technological externalities (Lucas 1988, Romer 1987).Increasing
returns could also arise even in the short run if unused capacity varies with
employment, as would happen if the short-run elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor were close to zero. Papers that find increasing returns at the
aggregate level at high frequencies include Caballero and Lyons (1990), Kienow
(1990), and Walters (1963). To ensure that the curves in figure 7 start above






Figure 7: Determination of the equilibrium employment rate.
wages would have to be positively related." In other words, equatingto the
real wage would make the Great Depression as big an outlier here as it is in
models with unique equilibria.
Let z —log[y/(l-y)],so that'2 y —l/(1+e).Substituting for F and
y in eq. (3) and inverting both aides yields
(4) aZ —v[(1+e)',x, u],
en implicit function to be solved for the equilibrium z. Now let (y, x, u) —
Which in developed countries they are, according to Table 7 of Greenwald
and Stiglitz (1988).
Note thatdz/dy —l/y(l-y),sothat zis a monotone increasing
transform of y. In the estimation, we take y1 to be the employment/population
ratio. Having obtained z in this way, we then linearly de-trend it. Employment,
not hours, seems the appropriate messure for y since we vary only the extensive
margin in this model.Kydland and Prescott (1989) have recently modelled
employment variations in both the extensive and intensive margins. As for x,,
it is the surprise in the logarithm of the U.S. money-supply (Ml) in period t,
when it is regressed on its own lag, and lagged z.Exogeneity of x, is, of
course, doubtful, especially at yearly frequencies; we shall nevertheless assume
it here.
12
450$(y)x'u. Substituting foron the right-hand side of (4), taking logs and
rearranging, we get
z -fllog[(l+etYhi—flflogx+ filogu -logy.




Now if the two curves in figure 7 are to start above the 450 line and are to end
up below it, z -logmust go to infinity as z -.., andto minus infinity as
z -._o• Since3 is the dominant term on the right-hand side of (5), this
means that a3 must be positive.
Substituting in (5) and dividing by a3 leads to:
(6) z3 + a1z2 + a2z + clogx1 + a0 —
13The restriction that this places on (y) is, of course, that (y)
approximate a cubic in the variable log]y/(l-y)], so that must be translog in
form.
We chose the cubic approximation for several reasons. First, it delivers
the familiar S-shape under regime $ in Figure 7.Second, a quadratic leads to
the problem of nonexistence of equilibrium for some values of x, u and v. And
third, a polynomial of order higher than 3 would need to be of an order of at
least S (for reasons having to do with corner conditions, reasons that we shall
elaborate on below), and with our short time series that number of parameters
could not be precisely estimated.
14 Loosely speaking, if is some multiple of the marginal product of labor,
this marginal product must go to infinity as y •0,and it must go to zero as
y -'1.
13where a1 —e2/m3, a2 —a1/a3,c —- fl&/a3, a0 —OQ/03,and
—([fllogu-logy]-E[logu
-logv])/e3.Sinceand e3 are both positive,
if we believe thst & >0then at any locally stable equilibrium, we expect to
find that c C 0.This point will resurface when we look at the empirical
results.
Letuspause here and go over what we have done,With the specific
functional forms, the transformation from y to z, and the cubic approximation
for ,wahave transformed our structural equation (3) into the manageable form
(6). The ideal procedure is to estimate this implicit function directly rather
than solve it for the reduced form correspondence, because one would not then
have to assume anything about how the solutions to (6) are chosen. Unfortunately
the maximum likelihood method will not do for this purpose because when (6) has
multiple roots, the value of the Jacobian of the transformation from e to z
will generally vary over the solutions to (6).So we used an instrumental
variable method instead, but as the results were rather poor we shall discuss
them only at the end,
We now specify the laws of motion for the unobservable variables --and
the equilibrium indicator. A large c reflects a rightward shift of demand, or
a rightward shift of supply, or both. As in the real business cycle model
(Prescott 1986) let
(7) — PCt_i +




When A >0,let d1 —-2jA-a/3,and let d1 —d1+ijAfor i —2,3, 4. Also,
let r1 —-2AJA + a0-a1a2/3+2a31/27,and r2 —r1+4AJA.
The d0 and r0 are shown in figure 8.Multiple equilibria arise only when
-
eclogxE [r1,r2]. As A -'0, r2 -r1—'0, and multiple equilibria disappear. In
other words, we are in regime M if and only if A >0.
When A <0,the equilibrium correspondence is still S-shaped, but it is now
single-valued.
t- clogx
Autocorrelatedeguilibrium selection. When in regime M, and when -clogx(r1,
r2), one of three equilibria must be chosen.In this region the equilibrium
correspondence has three branches, which we label 1, 2, and 3 from the bottom up.






Figure 8: The equilibrium correspondence in regime M.a 3 X 3 Markov chain. This Markov chain describes the link between equilibrium
choices in consecutive periods.
But whet if c -clogxwas not in (r1, r2) in the previous period, and
enters it this period? Here, we assume that the probability that a branch is
chosen is the steady state probability for that branch for the Matkov chain
described above. This is natural if one believes that the selection process has
memory during consecutive periods in (r1, r2), but not if the spell in (r1, r2)
is interrupted. Moreover, this assumption introduces no new parameters. All in
all, the selection mechanism introduces three new parameters.
The selection mechanism can capture a variety of plausible hypotheses about
how equilibria ate chosen.For instance, if,r2 —0,the "naively" unstable
branch 2 will never materialize.15 And if —1,the economy will always
settle on the high activity equilibrium. Under some added assumptions, this
equilibrium is the one at which welfare is also at its highest, although further
Pareto improvements could occur if employment were raised even further so long
as this could be done without distorting a margin other than the one bearing on
the participation decision.
Let d(d1, d2, d3, d4). Then d determines what branch of the equilibrium
correspondence a particular z1 lies on. Let Y(z1, z, d) —Iif z jumps from
branch i at t-l, to branch j at t, and let it be zero otherwise. Similarly, let
Y(z1, z, d) —1if z jumps to branch j at t from somewhere outside the region
of multiplicity at t-l, and let it be zero otherwise. Then we shall assume that
While we would prefer not to even mention out of equilibrium dynamics,
one can hypothesize something similar to the familiar tatonnemenc process in
Walrasian equilibrium. The middle solution is unstable in the sense that if "by
mistake" employment were, say, a bit larger than the equilibrium value, even more
people would wish to enter the market, and if it were a bit smaller, even more




where 1. Thus when i 0 j, the transition probabilities are independent
of i. The steady state probabilities of this 3-state Markov chain are just it1,
it2 and its, which means that
(10) Pr ( Y(z11, z, d) —1) — j—1,2, 3.
The 3 new parameters are it1, it2 and the parameter b, which is an index of serial
dependence in the selection mechanism. When b —0no transitions occur (perfect
autocorrelation). When b —1the selection is i.i.d. ,withprobabilities it1,
it2 and it3.'6 One can thus think of p and 1-b as parameters that compete in
explaining the persistence that the z exhibit. The first measures the
persistence stemming from the real side, the second measures the persistence
arising from the selection side.
The Likelihood Function. Let —1if i —jand zero otherwise. Then the
log likelihood of the sample is
A coordination role for money could be captured by allowing the w and
possibly b as well to depend on x6, or on Ml itself, in some simple way.
17logL EY(z1, z1, d) log(bw +
i—ii—i t—2









Thelikelihood fectors so that one can maximize itin three steps. The
firststep conditions on d and chooses p, c, a, and a2 to maximize
(12) -(T-l)loga5 -(l/2a25)E(z2 +a1z25 + a2z5 ÷ a3(l-p)
+clogx5
-p(z31_2 + a1z25_1 + a2z5_1 + clogx1_1)).
TheJacohian slog 3z +2a1z5+a2isleft out at this stage, and the next
because once d (and hence a1 and a2) is given, this expression is a constant.
The second step still conditions on d and chooses w1, or2, 123andb to maximize
(13) LY(z21, z5, d)log (bor+ I{j.,}(l-b))+EEY(z5i,z2, d)logor.
2.1j.1 2.2 i—i 5.2
Thefunctional forms of (9) and (10) prevent us from calculating the ML estimate
of the or explicitly.A standard approach would then use the first order
conditions along with an iteration procedure. However, we use a less costly
alternative based on an algorithm that maximizes (13) over a large finite set of
parameter values. This set is a discretized approximation of the parameter space
18generated by it1,it2 andb. The third and final stage maximizes the likelihood
over d. A more detailed description of the procedure is in the Appendix.
Identification. When A C0,this problem is standard and the selection rule in
eq. (9) and eq. (10) does not come into play.But when a1 and a2 imply a
positive A, they determine the d1 and hence the and Y uniquely, and this
identifies b and the icj.Thelikelihood function is otherwise standard, and its
remaining parameters clearly are identified.
Estimates. We computed maximum likelihood estimates using annual data on
employment and the money-supply for three separate time periods: 1901-1940,
1921-1940 and 1951-1986. Surprisingly, uniqueness does better than multiplicity
in each case -- is highest when A <0.We also computed the local maximum,
in each period, over the region for which A >0.These local maxima are
reported in the first column of each table. A curious and unexpected property
of the estimates for the general case is that when A is in the region where the
structure is afforded the "luxury" of assigning observations into one of rhree
separate regimes, it chooses to assign all of the observations to the second,
middle branch. This is all the more puzzling because this branch is unstable.
Surprise money does well in explaining the movements in employment. For
instance, employment reductions during the Great Depression coincide with periods
in which surprise money was negative.This seeming ability of the exogenous
regressor to "explain" what would otherwise appear as shifts in regime might
preclude the structures with multiplicity from doing better. For this reason,
19columns 4 and S of each table report estimates that constrain c to be zero.17
Following that, we constrain p to be zero. Under this constraint, any
persistence that z exhibits is explainable only by persistence in the way
equilibria are chosen. These estimates too should favor multiplicity. FThafly,
we report estimates that set p and c both equal to zero. This case should favor
multiple equilibria the most.
Turning to table 1, we find that the estimates that the first column
reports do not maximize the likelihood. Moreover, at the local maximum in the
A > 0 region, a2 —1--theselection rule always chooses the middle, unstable
branchl Because of this, c is estimated to be positive, implying that 6 is
negative, so that surprise money reducesI This rather strange estimate comes
about because the raw correlation between z and x is positive (causing a highly
significant and positive OLS coefficient reported at the foot of the table), and
the only way to get the model to mimic this at an unstable equilibrium is if c
is in fact positive. This is clear from figure 8. The estimate of b —1is
meaningless: It says that equilibrium selection is iid, but this is because
selection is driven by a degenerate random variable, so that b is not identified.
The ML estimate is in column 2. It lies in the uniqueness region, and the
equilibrium is stable, which is reflected in a negative estimate of c. Figure
9a plots the estimated equilibrium correspondence at the median c, as a function
of x. This is the curve ML. The curve ML is based on the first column of the
table. Figure Pa also depicts the linear OLS regression line. The figure is
deceptive in one respect: At first glance it would seem that a cubic could do
17Wepresent these estimates to help us understand the estimation
techniques, and not because we expected the restrictions c —0to be valid;
clearly, it isn't because it denies any relation between x and z, and yet the
data show a significant and positive correlation between the two in each
subperiod.
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Least Squares Estimates (1-ratios in parentheses):






19321933- 020.3 log x
Figure9a: Eui1ibrium at — 0
21better then ML in that it could get closer to same of the points if it had more
curvature. While this is true at c —0,it would not maximize the likelihood
because bounces around.19
The ML estimate remains in the uniqueness region even if we force p or c
to be zero one at a time. Only when kQhofthem are set to zero does the ML
estimate choose the parameters from the region of multiplicity. A graphical
representation in z -logxspace is not helpful when c —0because z and x are
then unrelated. But the case where p —0is of some interest: When p —0,the
selection rule now assigns positive weight to the bottom branch of the
equilibrium correspondence, although most of the weight still goes on the middle
branch. Just two out of the forty z5's are put on the bottom branch of the
equilibrium correspondence.The years were 1932 and 1933.The estimated
equilibrium correspondence is plotted in figure 9b.
According to these estimates, the autocorrelation in the choice of
equilibria, as measured by 1-b is high: The probability of remaining on branch
i from one period to the next is 1-b+b2r8. The last two sets of estimates in
table 1 put this probability at about .97 for branch 2, and at about .7 for
branch 1. We had originally conjectured that such parameter values would be part
of the unconstrained ML estimate, but this was not the case.19
18 The stationary distribution of c has variance a25/(l-p2) which, according
to the estimates in column 2, means that the standard deviation of c is about
.03. On the other hand, the estimates of a implied by the first column are
three times as high. According to figure 8 this estimate must be divided by c
to correct it into units of x. Using estimates of (p a )fromeither column
gives us a standard deviation of roughly unity for the ef6ct of unobservables
in units of x.
19 Bernanke (1983, esp. Table 2) observes that his linear Phillips curve-
type model leaves much of the depression-era variability in output unexplained.
His response is to add variables measuring bank failures and liabilities of firms
on the right hand side of his regressions, but the endogeneity of these variables
makes those regressions hard to interpret.Our approach is to instead add
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log x
Figure9b: 1901-1940 ML estimate at—0,constrained by p —0.
The next set of results deal with the 1921-40 period, and they are reported
in table 2. We had expected structures with non-uniqueness to do especially well
here. That they do not in the general case reflects surprise money's ability to
track employment fairly closely in this subperiod. But as soon as either p or
c are constrained at zero, multiple equilibrium is the ML choice. But the middle
branch still gets all the weight (s —1).Paradoxically, this middle branch of
the ML curve slopes in the opposite direction of the ML and the OLS line (see
figure 10), which is no doubt caused by the large sampling error in the estimated
coefficients.The estimate of b is meaningless here because there are no
transitions among the three branches, and so b plays no role.2° Figure 10 plots
20 In eq. (13), when r2 —1,the expression bird+I{j_j)(l-b) does not depend
on b when j —2.When j # 2, Y is itself zero, so again the likelihood does




The Case c — 0
.1>0 .1<0t








MeG. 55.002 56.155 53.732 55.923 54.6549.39 53.373 46.238
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24ML and ML (for the general case) along with the linear OLS regression line.
Table 3 reports results for the l951-g6 period, results that we
anticipated would not show evidence of multiplicity because this set of bivariate
data seem to contain no outliers, no distinct clusters. As the table shows,
uniqueness does better than multiplicity no matter what restrictions one imposes.
Incidentally, the OLS regressions show that the Phillips curve relation was
weaker in this period than prior to World War II.
On the whole, then, employment fluctuations since 1900 are better accounted
fot by a structure that exhibits uniqueness of equilibrium at all times, a
structure that ascribes all fluctuations to movements in fundamentals. Rut this
conclusion is tenuous because A does not differ significantly from zero. Its
ML estimates are -0.023, -0.009, and -0.023 for the three subperiods. Given the
standard errors for a1 and a2, these estimates of A do not differ significantly
from zero.
The Instrumental Variables Approach. When estimating models that have multiple
solutions, the instrumental variables approach is appealing because it requires
neither an explicit solution for the endogenous variable (See Ainmmiya (1973)),
nor any assumption about the way in which solutions are chosen. That is, the
assumptions we make in equations (9) and (10) are unnecessary with this approach,
which works directly on the implicit function defining the equilibrium point,
which in this case is in eq. (6).
We used the approach as described in Judge et al (1985), p. 168, to
estimate the reduced form equation (6) for the special case where c —0:21
27.Amore advanced treatment of these issues is in Gallant (1977).

















MxL 79,424 81.364 79.40081.332 75.82478.605 74.10676.845
d-0.578 -0.578 -0.640 -0634















































































We used x and x2 as instruments for z and z2,respectively, in eq. (6)' while
treating z3 as the dependent variable. Since we use XL as one of the
instruments, we can not include it as an additional regressor in (6)' since its
coefficient, c ,wouldnot be identified.
The results are in Table 4. They show that the approach works poorly here.
The estimates are quite imprecise; in most cases their absolute values are less
than the standard error. The reason for this is of course that x and x2 are
poot instruments for CL and Z2L so that this procedure also offers no firm
conclusion about the sign of A.
Table 4:lnstrueeetal Variables Estleates
1901-1940 1921-1940 1951-1986
eat. std. aLter est. oLd. errsr cot, old, error
a0
-.00136 .00268 .00176 .03984 .00347 .0055
a0 .30542 .43176 ..111321.0531 -.57139 .87505
a2 .00999 .06397 .04129 .1239 -.00446 .01474
3. Conclusion.
In spite of the extra parameters that the multiple equilibrium structures
introduce, namely it7,or,and b, they fit about the same or a little worse than
structures with unique equilibria.The exercise does not, however, treat
multiplicity in the most charitable way because the mechanism that chooses
equilibria does not depend on x. An S-shaped curve passing through the points
in figures 10, 11 and 12 will explain much more if x is allowed to determine
27which of threo branches gets chosen at date t.This will be the case if the
Fed's actions serve a coordination role end act to signal which equilibrium gets
chosen. But how does one operationalize such a concept? If the selection rule's
dopondence on XL is arbitrary, this introduces as many parameters as thero are
time periods, and with just two time-series on observablos, the loss of degrees
of freedom is too large. Moreover, section 58 of Jovanovic (1989) shows that
unless one has prior information on just how exactly an exogenous observable
affects the selection mechanism, one is, in this bivariate context at least,
likely to fall prey to using a model that is consistent with (or, rather, can not
be refuted by) just about any correlation pattern one might see. The natural
procedure would use a parsimonious representation of the m1 and b as a function
of x or x or other exogenous obaervables.
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31Appendix: The Maximue, Likelihood Procedure. Eq. (7) implies that
3 2 3 2 +a1z+a2zt+a0(l—p)+clogx,—p(z1+a1z_1+a2z1+clogxi=
where('it)iswhite noise with 'inormallydistributed N(O, a5). When
equilibriumis unique, i.e., when C-clogx1 [r1,r2] ,thelikelihood
therefore is of the form
L1 II(c)T1exp[-J_E(z+az+a2z+a5(l-p)+clog;
t.2
—p (z +a1z1+azzt_l+clogx)) I
whereJis the Jscobian of the mapping (c2, c3 c2)-,(Z2,Z3
and where Z — ÷a1z2 + a2z + clogx + a.By straight forwsrd calculus
logJ 1og3z +2a2z+aj
In the regime with three equilibria we must take into account the likelihood
of the selection of equilibria. Let be the probability of switching from
branch i to branch j from one year to another, i, j —1,2, 3. Similarly let
be the probability of selecting branch j, j —1,2, 3, given a unique
equilibrium in the previous yemr.
From assumptions (9) and (10), qjj — +(l-fl)11C..jland P —'ri.It is
easily verified that (it3)arethe steady state probabilities of this Markov
chain.
32The Likelihood of the equilibrium selection process, L2, is therefore
L2 II[1 II
t—s i—i j.1
Note that L2 is a conditional likelihood given the selection in period one.
The likelihood function in the general case thus has the form
L =
whichimplies (11) of the text.
Consider next the parameters d defined on page 10 (1>0) .The








This means that the parameters d1 and d4 determine the regimes as well as the
coefficients a1 and a2. Moreover, if an observation z lies within (d1, d2)
then the lower branch is selected whereas the middle branch is selected if z
6 (d2, d3), etc..
33Let (dim) and (dAn) be two finite sequences. For all m,n such that dim <
d4define a partition, P, of this sample )z) by
=
{(minz1 dim)(dimS d), (d, d2), (d3, dAfl), (d4m.maxzt)}
wheredand d3,,,, are given by (Al) with d1 and dA replaced by dim and d4m.
Sincethesample size is T the total number of partitions of the sample is
T(T-l)/2. For a given partition a and a2 are given and the remaining
parameters are to be determined by maximizing (12) and (13) .Letthe
likelihood function that corresponds to these estimates conditional on P be
denoted by i,. The ML estimates are those which maximize I with respect to
(a, n).
Mote that the standard errors reported above are only computed for ihe
case with a unique equilibrium. To obtain the corresponding estimates in the
case with multiple equilibria is possible through bootstrap simulation
procedures, but we leave this for future work.
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